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ABSTRACT 
 
The Time Course of Discourse Priming in the Interpretation of Conceptual  
 
Combinations. (August 2005) 
 
Randy Earl Sappington, B.A., Mississippi State University 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Heather Bortfeld 
 
 
 
People often create novel lexical expressions to efficiently communicate their 
thoughts to others.  Noun-noun phrases, also known as conceptual 
combinations, serve as an example of these novel expressions.  Most of the 
research on conceptual combination has focused on structural features of the 
phrases.  However, other research has demonstrated that discourse context can 
also influence how these phrases are interpreted.  Across two experiments, we 
demonstrate that discourse context has a greater influence on how people 
interpret these combinations than does a structural level manipulation.  We also 
examine the strength of this contextually based-effect over a series of time 
delays.  The findings from this study indicate that, while structural features of a 
given conceptual combination influence how that combination is interpreted, the 
discourse surrounding the novel combination plays a more influential role in the 
resulting interpretation.  The influence of context is more pronounced than has 
been suggested in much of the research on conceptual combination. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Well, if crime fighters fight crime and fire fighters fight fire, what do 
freedom fighters fight? (Carlin, 1990) 
Language users often take advantage of lexical shortcuts to express a complex 
message more efficiently.  George Carlin’s comedic observation illustrates the 
flexible nature of these shortcuts in figurative language.  In the first two 
examples he provides, the fighter is battling against the concept used to 
describe what kind of fighter the person is (e.g. a fire fighter is a person who 
fights fires), but the third phrase, freedom fighters, describes fighters who are 
fighting for freedom rather than a person fighting against freedom.  Just as 
people are able to easily produce these creative lexical shortcuts to express a 
nuanced concept, they are also capable of quick and efficient interpretations of 
these phrases.  Researchers have offered several explanations for how people 
are able to form and interpret these novel phrases with ease, including how 
these phrases develop (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005), how structure guides their 
interptretation (Murphy, 1996, 1997), and how discourse context helps decode 
them (Chaffin, 1997; Cook & Myers, 2003).  
Discourse context, the expositional phrases surrounding an unfamiliar 
term, has been identified as an important factor in how people disambiguate 
many creative forms of language.  Indeed, there is ample evidence of the 
influence of discourse context on language comprehension in other domains.   
__________ 
This thesis follows the style of Experimental Psychology. 
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In the case of narratives, discourse context can affect the comprehension of a 
word by facilitating lexical access itself or by facilitating integration of the 
concept introduced by that word with the preceding text.  Techniques such as 
eye-tracking and event-related potentials are allowing increasingly fine-grained 
analysis of the time course of language comprehension.  What is becoming clear 
from this research is that contextual information is influential early in the 
processing of spoken and written language, and that discourse acts as a lens to 
focus comprehension on one specific sense rather than leave readers and 
listeners blind to the meaning the speaker or writer wishes to express.  For 
example, a recent study demonstrated that semantic structure and surrounding 
context were equally important in the comprehension of focal concepts in 
narrative discourse (Cook & Myers, 2003).  These researchers found that if prior 
context supported an interpretation of a concept that would normally be 
considered inappropriate, the semantic appropriateness effect was overridden 
by the contextual information.  In another study (Myers, Cook, Kambe, Mason, & 
O’Brien, 2000), in which both the semantic and episodic availability of 
information necessary for comprehending a sentence was manipulated, normally 
strong semantic effects could be eliminated entirely when information useful to 
comprehension was highly elaborated several sentences earlier in the text.  
Such elaboration is detailed and episodic in nature; it is not comparable to the 
semantic associations elicited by a single word. 
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The influential effect of discourse context has also been recognized by 
researchers interested in how people assign meaning to novel words.  For 
example, Chaffin (1997) suggests that people are aware of the context in which 
a target word appears, but how they use this context depends on how familiar 
they are with the word.  When people in this study saw a familiar word in 
context, they tended to use an event-based strategy to define the target word, in 
which they chose a definition that was consistent with the context.  However, 
when participants were given a low-familiarity or novel word, participants only 
used the definition of the word rather than using the surrounding context to 
refine a definition.  In another study, people spent more time reading a discourse 
that was informative about a novel word than a discourse that used familiar 
words (Chafin, Morris, and Seely, 2001).  While supporting the argument that 
people use the surrounding context to derive the meaning of a novel word, this 
finding also suggests that people might use two separate processes depending 
on whether the discourse contains novel or familiar words. 
The effect of discourse context on language comprehension has recently 
been added to the rapidly-expanding volume of research using fMRI (Xu, 
Kemeny, Park, Frattali, & Braun, 2005).  In this study, participants were 
presented with single words, sentences, and narrative passages adapted from 
Aesop’s fables.  Results provide evidence that while the presentation of a single 
word activates perisylvian cortices, areas of the cerebral cortex typically 
activated in language processing, more complex, narrative-like stimuli not only 
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increased the blood oxygenation levels in those perisylvian regions, but also 
activated areas of the brain not normally associated with language processing, 
including subcortical regions such as the hippocampus and the amygdala.  
Additionally, right hemisphere activation, usually associated with cognitive 
processes such as inference making and conceptual association was most 
robust during presentation of the discourse-like stimuli.  This finding suggests an 
important difference between the brain activity necessary to make sense of a 
single word and that necessary to work through words linked together as a 
meaningful whole.  This difference highlights the importance of discourse 
context in evoking emergent properties of figurative language – properties that 
would not normally be associated with a term in the absence of such context.  
While there is evidence for a difference between how the brain processes 
different levels of lexical complexity (e.g. single words, sentences, and 
narratives), what is less well understood is how other important factors such as 
word order, word similarity, and other semantic aspects of language interact with 
higher level narrative features.  Discourse is just one of many factors examined 
in research concerning the production and comprehension of figurative 
language.  Bortfeld & McGlone (2001) argued that while the linguistic structure 
of the figurative phrase has some bearing on its interpretation, this interpretation 
varies enormously from context to context.  Some researchers have suggested 
that phrases have “careers” (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005), a notion intended to 
characterize how the meanings associated with novel phrases develop over 
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time.  This focus on the development of metaphors suggests that when people 
are given a novel metaphor (e.g. a mind is a kitchen), they process the metaphor 
as a simile, which compares the base term to the target term, but as a novel 
metaphor becomes more conventionalized through repeated use (e.g. a soldier 
is a pawn), people form a semantic relationship between the base term and the 
target term of the metaphor which leads to categorization of the base term as a 
member of the same category to which the target term belongs.  Other research 
suggests that the metaphorical knowledge developed through prior experience 
(Gibbs, 1992), the conceptual similarity between the component concepts of the 
figurative phrase (Murphy, 1996, 1997), and salient or familiar uses of a 
figurative phrase (Giora, 1997, 2002) can all affect a person’s comprehension of 
that phrase.  In addition to the difficulty associated with determining which 
factors are important in figurative language comprehension, some of the words 
in figurative phrases (e.g. idioms) may not have a literal connection to the 
meaning they wish to express.  An example of this is the idiomatic phrase kick 
the bucket.  Through experience, English speakers know that this phrase is an 
idiomatic reference to the act of dying, yet none of the words in the phrase are 
literally semantically associated with death.  Other phrases make more 
transparent relationships to the figurative meanings (e.g. the idiomatic phrase 
easy as pie compares the ease of a task to the ease of eating a piece of pie). 
Gibbs and Nayak (1989) demonstrated that some idioms are flexible such that a 
change in syntax does not affect the interpretation of the target figurative phrase, 
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but others, such as kick the bucket, do not tolerate such syntactic manipulations.  
These sources of variability in figurative language highlight the difficulty inherent 
in studying anything but the most literal language. 
While noun-noun combinations are a form of figurative language that is 
not as complex as most other forms of figurative language, the study of these 
combinations is similarly fraught with difficulty.   By studying these noun-noun 
pairs or conceptual combinations, researchers can exert a level of experimental 
control that more complex figurative phrases, such as metaphors and idioms, 
make much more difficult.  Like other forms of figurative language, conceptual 
combinations can be lexicalized (e.g. student evaluation) and novel (e.g. paper 
equipment).  Furthermore, among novel combinations, some phrases can be 
quite literal in their intended interpretation (e.g. the term onion tears describes 
the tears one cries when they cut an onion) while others might require contextual 
experience for a clear interpretation (e.g. a festival town could be a town that 
holds a festival or a town that is formed by a festival patrons).  A good example 
of a recently lexicalized conceptual combination is the term soccer mom.  Over 
time and through use, the term soccer mom has come to refer to a mother who 
transports her children to and from soccer practice via some large vehicle such 
as a station wagon, a minivan, or a sports utility vehicle.  One would have 
difficulty deriving the interpretation of soccer mom from the knowledge base 
associated with the words soccer or mom.  This is because other inferences are 
also drawn from the expression that would not normally be attributed to either of 
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the two constituent words.  For example, a soccer mom’s willingness to transport 
her children to and from soccer games (e.g. an event that promotes physical 
fitness) suggests that this is a person who is invested in the welfare and 
development of her children.  Her ownership of a large vehicle suggests a 
certain socioeconomic status.  Many additional attributes are called to mind 
through the use of this term based on cultural knowledge or membership.  These 
inferences are the result of people’s knowledge of what soccer and mom are, as 
well as the culturally-based semantic knowledge of properties associated with 
each of these terms in combination.  The term soccer mom and its current 
conventional interpretation are a good example of how emergent properties not 
associated with either constituent word in the pair have become associated with 
the words in combination. 
A growing body of research has focused on how people interpret 
conceptual combinations, focusing specifically on the structural aspects of the 
combinations (e.g. Wilkenfeld & Ward, 2001, Estes, 2003, Gagné & Shoben, 
2002, Wisniewski, 1996, Wisniewski & Love, 1998).  This work has isolated 
several characteristics that appear to determine how people generally interpret a 
conceptual combination, given no additional contextual biases.  These include 
such structural characteristics as the order of the words in the combination 
(Gagné, 2000), the similarity of the two concepts (Wilkenfeld & Ward, 2001), and 
the spatial alignment of the constituent concepts in relation to one another 
(Wisniewski & Middleton, 2002). While such structural issues have dominated 
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much of the research on these phrases, there is a growing body of data 
indicating the overriding influence of the surrounding context on interpretations 
of these expressions (Gerrig & Murphy, 1992, Gerrig & Bortfeld, 1999; Gagné & 
Spalding, 2004).  However, these studies have not investigated the interaction of 
the structural features of the phrases with the surrounding discourse context.    
The present study will compare a particular structural approach, the CARIN 
theory, as proposed by Gagné and her colleagues (Gagné & Shoben, 1997, 
Gagné 2000, Gagné, 2001, Gagné & Shoben, 2002) and a discourse context-
based approach (Gerrig & Murphy, 1992, Gerrig & Bortfeld, 1999) to determine 
which is more influential in guiding people’s interpretation of conceptual 
combinations. 
The Competition Among Relations in Nominals (CARIN) theory (Gagné & 
Shoben, 1997, Gagné, 2000, Gagné, 2001, Gagné & Shoben, 2002) focuses on 
the semantic relationships formed between the constituent words of the 
combination and how people are able to establish the meaning of the phrases 
based on these relations.  This diverges from other structure-based theories of 
conceptual combination that rely on the semantic similarity of the constituent 
words of the phrase.  However, CARIN is similar to other structural theories of 
conceptual combination in that the semantic relationships proposed are based 
solely on the two words in the combination rather than the semantic 
relationships between the words in the combination and terms outside the 
combination (e.g. the surrounding discourse context).  CARIN predicts that 
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participants will give widely different interpretations for the same phrases based 
on the relations they have experienced prior to the interpretation of a conceptual 
combination.  This prediction stems from CARIN’s competition element, in which 
relations of combinations compete to become the dominant interpretation for the 
phrase.  Relations that express an interpretation that is more consistent with the 
interpreter’s existing knowledge of the constituent concepts are more strongly 
activated and, thus, lead people to a default interpretation for the phrase.   
To test relations, Gagné and her colleagues have used a priming 
procedure in which one of the nouns in the priming combination is also part of 
the target combination.  Gagné and her colleagues have used this repetition of a 
noun from the priming combination to the target combination as an effective 
method for controlling the activation of a specific relation.  In addition to using 
the priming combination to control which relations are activated, this method of 
priming relations has provided an understanding of the structural contributions 
that constituent nouns bring to the combination.  Results from this research 
suggest that priming using a repeated modifier noun facilitates relation priming 
more readily than a repeated head noun.  The head noun of a combination plays 
a role in the evaluation of the plausibility of the relations suggested by the 
modifier, but it does not play a role in the initial activation of those relations 
(Gagné & Shoben, 2002).   
While this priming effect indicates how people may interpret these 
combinations in isolation, a growing body of evidence supporting the 
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disambiguating effects of discourse context on novel lexical expressions is also 
relevant.  Results from Gerrig and Murphy (1992) suggest that people are able 
to understand a unique conceptual combination by integrating the combination 
with the surrounding discourse context to form a plausible interpretation.  In this 
series of experiments the researchers were able to demonstrate that not only 
are people able to derive a meaning of a conceptual combination from an explicit 
discourse context, but they are able to retain this meaning for use in a delayed 
memory task by presenting the discourse context to participants and asking 
them true/false questions concerning the intended interpretation of the target 
combination.  In a later study, Gerrig and Bortfeld (1999) provide further 
evidence of the degree to which novel conceptual combinations are 
disambiguated by accompanying discourse contexts. Instead of using a 
structural aspect of the combination to influence interpretation, these 
researchers were able to demonstrate how context can radically influence the 
way a person interprets conceptual combinations by placing the target 
combinations in biasing contexts. In this study, a series of vignettes was 
constructed, each of which biased a typical or a novel interpretation of a target 
conceptual combination.  Although novel interpretations were harder to 
understand, the results clearly demonstrated that discourse context is necessary 
for inducing an innovative interpretation of conceptual combinations.  
Furthermore, recent research suggests that people tend to provide 
interpretations of conceptual combinations that are congruent with the discourse 
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in which participants first encountered the target conceptual combination 
(Bortfeld, Sappington, Smith, & Hull, submitted for publication, 2005).  This effect 
lasts for as long as two days after only a brief initial exposure to the biasing 
discourse.   These results indicate that, particularly in the case of novel 
interpretations, discourse context guides interpretation.  Repeated exposure to 
such contextually guided interpretations ultimately points to the way that novel 
interpretations of figurative phrases are disseminated among a larger cultural 
group. 
While discourse context has been established as an important factor in 
the interpretation of conceptual combinations, whether variable amounts of 
context lead to differential levels of comprehension is unclear.  Data from Gagné 
and Spalding (2004) suggest that a structural prime containing one of the words 
in the same position as in the target conceptual combination has just as much 
influence on the interpretation of that combination as a more elaborate discourse 
context.  While this finding takes both discourse context and structural theories 
into account, it does not provide an account of the relative influence of structure 
and discourse context on interpretations, nor does it establish the time course of 
the influence of these characteristics on people’s interpretations.  The current 
study seeks to determine the relative influence of structural priming and 
discourse priming over various periods of time on interpretation.   
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EXPERIMENT 1 
The purpose of Experiment 1 is to investigate the immediate effects of structural 
priming and discourse priming on conceptual combination interpretation.  For the 
purposes of this study, context-consistent interpretations, interpretations that are 
semantically similar to the priming material, will be used to measure the 
influence of the priming methods on interpretation of the target conceptual 
combination.   In this experiment, the two test conditions, structural priming (i.e. 
CARIN) and discourse priming (i.e. discourse context), were compared against a 
control condition of no priming.   
Method 
Participants.  Sixty Texas A&M undergraduate students participated in this study 
in exchange for credit to fulfill a class requirement. 
Materials.  Twelve conceptual combinations of the 36 combinations used by 
Gagné and Shoben (2002) were randomly selected for use in this study.  
Definition pages for the neutral condition contained the twelve selected 
conceptual combinations and a response fields for participants to define the 
combinations.    A series of sentences containing conceptual combinations that 
have the same modifier as the target combination was presented to participants 
in the structural priming condition (See Appendix B for a complete list of these 
sentences).  A series of vignettes containing at least one reference to each of 
the words in the target combination and the target conceptual combination was 
created for the discourse priming condition (See Appendix C for a complete list 
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of these vignettes).  All primes used in this experiment biased a sub-dominant 
interpretation of the target conceptual combinations. 
Procedure.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions.  In 
the neutral condition, participants were instructed to provide the first definition 
they could think of for the 12 target combinations.  Participants in the structural 
priming condition were presented with a task adapted from Gagné and Shoben 
(2002, Experiment 2) in which participants read a series of study sentences that 
contained the sub-dominant prime of the target conceptual combination.  
Participants were asked to flip the page over when they had completed reading 
the sentences.  These papers were collected, and participants were presented 
with a distractor task that contained twelve words from the sentences and twelve 
words that were not in the study sentences.  None of these words were part of 
the priming conceptual combinations.  Participants were instructed to circle the 
words that had appeared on the previous page of study sentences.  This 
manipulation check tests the memory of the participant to insure that they read 
the sentences, and acts as a distractor task between the presentation of the 
priming combination and the target combination.  Once participants had 
completed this task, the responses were collected and participants were given a 
page containing the twelve target conceptual combinations.  Participants were 
asked to define the twelve target combinations. 
Participants in the discourse priming condition were presented with reading 
packets that contained vignettes describing the target conceptual combinations.  
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Participants in this condition first read the vignettes, then rated how well they 
understood each vignette on a Likert-type scale from 1 “I don’t understand any 
of this” to 10 “I understand this completely”.  Participants were instructed to 
place the reading packet face down to indicate that they had finished reading 
and rating their understanding of the vignettes.  These reading packets were 
collected, and participants were presented with a distractor task that contained 
twelve words from the vignettes and twelve words that were not in the vignettes.  
None of the words taken from the vignettes were part of the target combination.  
Participants were instructed to circle the words that had appeared in the 
vignettes from the reading packet.  After completing this distractor task, 
participants were asked to define the target conceptual combinations.   
Coding.  Two lab assistants, blind to the procedure of this experiment, coded the 
data into dominant, sub-dominant, or other categories.  Dominant and sub-
dominant interpretations were based the norms gathered in the neutral condition 
of this experiment.  Raters were in agreement for 92.3% of the responses.  All 
disagreements on interpretations were resolved through consensus between the 
primary investigator and the raters.  Interpretations that did not adhere to either 
of these interpretations were coded into the other category.  The results section 
of this experiment will focus on the dominant and sub-dominant responses only.  
This coding strategy was used for all experiments discussed in this study.   
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Results 
All tests of significance performed in this study used an alpha level of .05 unless 
otherwise indicated.  All subject analyses will be indicated with the number 1 
(e.g. F1, t1), and all item analyses will be indicated with a number 2 (e.g. F2, t2).  
For this study, the most frequent definition for each combination in the neutral 
condition was used as the dominant interpretation for the combination, and the 
second most frequent definition provided for each combination was used as the 
sub-dominant interpretation.  See Appendix A for the dominant and sub-
dominant responses for each item and the percentage of responses these 
interpretations represented.  Figures 1a and 1b show the percentage of 
dominant and sub dominant responses in the participant and item analyses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1a: Percentages of responses for Experiment 1 participant analysis 
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Figure 1b: Percentages of responses for Experiment 1 item analysis 
 
 
 
Omnibus one-way ANOVAs show a priming effect for sub-dominant 
interpretations in both participant (M = 7.70, SEM = 0.41; F1 (2, 57) = 274.05, 
MSE = 0.99, partial η2 = 0.91 p < 0.01) and item analyses (M = 12.83, SEM = 
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SEM = 0.14; t2 (11) = 8.48, p < 0.01), which indicates that the priming materials 
are able to evoke a specific interpretation.   
Overall, participant analyses of the structural priming and discourse 
priming conditions indicate that both structural and discourse priming are 
effective in inducing an out-of-context sub-dominant interpretation (M = 7.70, 
SEM = 0.13) over an out-of-context dominant interpretation (M = 3.03, SEM = 
0.19, t1 (59) = 6.44, p < 0.01). This priming effect for sub-dominant 
interpretations (M = 6.60, SEM = 0.27) over dominant interpretations (M = 4.25, 
SEM = 0.32) was present in the structural priming condition (t1 (19) = 4.24, p < 
0.01) as well as discourse priming (M = 11.9, SEM = 0.09 for sub-dominant 
interpretations, M = 0.05, SEM = 0.05 for dominant interpretations; t1 (19) = 
95.52, p < 0.01).  This effect also held for the item analysis for discourse priming 
(M = 19.67 SEM = 0.14 for sub-dominant interpretations, M = 0.08, SEM = 0.08 
for dominant interpretations; t2 (11) = 101.47, p < 0.01) but was not present in 
the item analysis for structural priming (M = 11.00, SEM = 1.21 for sub-dominant 
interpretations, M = 7.08, SEM = 1.06; t2 (11) = 1.82, p = 0.10) suggesting that 
all of the items did not contribute to the effect seen in the participant analysis for 
structural priming.  Since the same target combinations were used in the 
structural priming and discourse priming, this finding indicates that the discourse 
priming material (i.e. a discourse context) is more effective at facilitating a 
specific interpretation for a target conceptual combination.  Table 1a and table 
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1b are a summary of the means and standard errors for the participant and item 
analyses. 
 
Table 1a.  Means and standard errors for Experiment 1 Participant Analysis 
 Priming Condition 
Interpretation Type Neutral Structural Priming Discourse Priming
Dominant 4.80 (0.48) 4.25 (0.32) 0.05 (0.05) 
Sub-Dominant 4.70 (0.26) 6.60 (0.27) 11.8 (0.09) 
 
 
Table 1b.  Means and standard errors for Experiment 1 Item Analysis 
 Priming Condition 
Interpretation Type Neutral Structural Priming Discourse Priming
Dominant 8.91 (0.40) 7.08 (1.06) 0.08 (0.08) 
Sub-Dominant 7.83 (0.37) 11.00 (1.21) 19.67 (0.14) 
 
 
While both structural priming and discourse priming demonstrated a 
biasing effect compared to the neutral condition in which participants were not 
exposed to any priming material prior to interpretation of the target conceptual 
combinations, participants in the discourse priming condition (M = 11.8, SEM = 
0.09) produced more interpretations that matched the interpretation biased in the 
priming material than participants in the structural priming condition (M = 6.60, 
SEM = 0.27; t1 (19) = 19.44, p < 0.01).  This difference was also present in the 
item analysis (M = 11.00 SEM = 1.21 for structural priming, M = 19.67 SEM = 
0.14 for discourse priming; t2 (11) = 6.01, p < 0.01).  This increase in 
interpretations matching the interpretation biased by the priming material 
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suggests that while structural priming is able to influence one’s interpretation of 
a given conceptual combination, discourse priming has a much stronger 
influence on the interpretation of a noun-noun combination. 
Discussion 
Results from Experiment 1 offer evidence supporting the notion that a discourse 
prime (i.e. discourse context) can have a strong influence on conceptual 
combination interpretation.  That is, both structural primes and discourse primes 
biased participants’ interpretations of a target conceptual combination, but 
discourse primes showed a more robust biasing effect.  This finding is consistent 
with other findings indicating that discourse context is an important factor in 
disambiguating novel lexical terms.  These data also indicate that there is a 
distinct difference between the influence of an discourse prime such as 
discourse context and that of a structural prime such as a similar noun-noun 
combination.   
Experiment 1 provides evidence of the respective influences of structural 
and discourse primes on conceptual combination, but it does not address the 
question of how robust these effects are over time.  If discourse priming and 
structural priming of conceptual combination interpretation are no different, as 
claimed by Gagné and Spalding (2004), then the sense biased by a structural 
prime should be retained for the same amount of time as one influenced by an 
discourse prime.  Thus, the purpose of Experiment 2 is to investigate this time 
course of sense retention across the two forms of priming.   
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EXPERIMENT 2 
While findings from Experiment 1 demonstrate that there is a difference between 
the influences of structural priming and discourse priming on conceptual 
combination interpretation, it does not address how long these two respective 
priming strategies continue to influence people’s interpretations of those 
combinations.  If the influences of structural and discourse priming are different, 
then one would expect to observe this difference when there is a time delay 
between the presentation of the priming material and interpretation of the target 
conceptual combination.  That is, there should be a greater retention for 
interpretations primed with discourse priming material over an extended time 
delay versus the same combination primed with a structural priming material.   
Method 
Participants. One hundred eight (108) Texas A&M undergraduate students 
participated in this study in exchange for credit to fulfill a requirement for an 
introductory psychology course 
Materials. In addition to the target combinations and primes used in Experiment 
1, two new non-verbal distractor tasks were added for Experiment 2.  These 
tasks were included in all structural and discourse priming conditions that were 
also part of a time delay in Experiment 2.   
Procedure.  Participants were randomly assigned to either a structural priming 
group (i.e. two word combinations priming the sub-dominant interpretation of the 
target conceptual combinations) or an discourse priming group (i.e. discourse 
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context biasing the sub-dominant interpretation of the target conceptual 
combinations).  Within these two groups, participants were randomly assigned to 
3 distinct time delay conditions: immediate, same-day delay, and two-day delay.  
The immediate condition was a replication of the procedure from Experiment 1.  
The same-day condition was similar to the immediate condition, but included two 
non-verbal filler tasks.  These non-verbal tasks were given immediately following 
the distractor task in both priming conditions.  After completing these filler tasks, 
participants were asked to define the 12 target conceptual combinations.  The 
two-day condition used the same materials as the same day condition, but the 
administration of the materials was spread across two experimental sessions 
spread across two days.  In both priming conditions, participants read the 
priming material, completed the distractor task, and completed one of the two 
non-verbal filler tasks.  Once participants had completed the non-verbal filler 
task, they were asked to come back two days later.  When the participants 
returned, they were given the other non-verbal filler task.  This second filler task 
was followed by the definition sheet containing the 12 target conceptual 
combinations. 
Results 
A 2 (priming type) x 3 (time delay) between subjects design was used in both the 
participant and item analyses.  Results from these analyses indicate that there is 
an interaction between priming type and time delay in both the participant 
analysis (M = 12.62, SEM = 0.38; F1 (2, 102) = 7.68, MSE = 2.28, partial η2 = 
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0.13 p < 0.01) and the item analysis (M = 12.55, SEM = 0.37; F2 (2, 22) = 4.98, 
MSE = 5.27, partial η2 = 0.31 p < 0.01).  This finding suggests that there is a 
change in the frequency of sub-dominant interpretations over the course of the 
three time delay conditions. There was a significant effect for priming in both the 
participant analysis (M = 12.61, SEM = 0.64; F1 (1,102) = 131.52, MSE = 2.28, 
partial η2 = 0.56, p < 0.01) and the item analysis (M = 12.56, SEM = 0.64; F2 
(1,11) = 44.86, MSE = 10.03, partial η2 = 0.80, p < 0.01), which indicates that the 
structural and discourse priming conditions successfully primed the sub-
dominant interpretation for the target conceptual combinations.  There was also 
a significant effect for delay in the participant analysis (M = 12.61, SEM = 0.53; 
F1 (2, 102) = 19.93, MSE = 2.28, partial η2 = 0.28, p < 0.01), which indicates 
that there was a change in the frequency of sub-dominant interpretations over 
the three experimental time delays.  The time delay effect was also present 
across items (M = 12.56, SEM = 0.53; F2 (2, 17) = 15.24, MSE = 1.36, partial η2 
= 0.58, p < 0.01).  These effects provide evidence that retention for the biased 
interpretation changes over the course of time.  Figures 2a and 2b show the 
percentages of sub-dominant responses for the structural priming and discourse 
priming conditions. 
Both priming types were successful in biasing an out-of-context sub-
dominant interpretation over an out-of-context dominant interpretation across the 
three experimental time delays.  This bias was most apparent in the immediate 
time delay condition for discourse priming (M = 11.28, SEM = 0.28 for sub-
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dominant interpretations, M = 0.11, SEM = 0.07 for dominant interpretations; t1 
(17) = 45.42, SE = 0.25, p < 0.01) and for structural priming (M = 7.17, SEM = 
0.38 for sub-dominant interpretations, M = 4.22, SEM = 0.11 for sub-dominant 
interpretations; t1 (17) = 3.73, p < 0.01).  This effect remains strong for the 
same-day condition for discourse priming (M = 10.83, SEM = 0.32 for sub-
dominant interpretations, M = 0.72, SEM = 0.23 for dominant interpretations; t1 
(17) = 19.56, p < 0.01) and structural priming (M = 6.67. SEM = 0.41 for sub-
dominant interpretations, M = 4.22, SEM = 0.38 for dominant interpretations; t1 
(17) = 3.24, SE = 0.76, p < 0.01).  The biasing effect remains present in the two-
day delay for discourse priming (M = 7.94, SEM = 0.36 for sub-dominant 
interpretations, M = 3.11, SEM = 0.38 for dominant interpretations; t1 (17) = 
6.80, p < 0.01) and structural priming (M = 6.22, SEM = 0.41 for sub-dominant 
interpretations, M = 4.56, SEM = 0.41 for dominant interpretations; t1 (17) = 
2.16, p = 0.04).  These findings indicate that both discourse and structural 
priming are capable of biasing a sub-dominant interpretation for up to two days 
after a brief exposure to the priming materials.  Item analyses for discourse 
priming show this same effect in the immediate condition (M = 17.00, SEM = 
0.25 for sub-dominant interpretations, M = 0.17, SEM = 0.11 for dominant 
interpretations; t2 (11) = 62.20, SE = 0.27, p < 0.01), same-day condition (M = 
16.25, SEM = 0.28 for sub-dominant interpretations, M = 1.08, SEM = 0.19 for 
dominant interpretations; t2 (11) = 35.82 SE = 0.42, p < 0.01), and the two-day 
condition (M = 11.92, SEM = 0.94 for sub-dominant interpretations, M = 4.67, 
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SEM = 1.04 for dominant interpretations;t2 (11) = 3.75, SE = 1.94, p < 0.01).  
However, the item analyses for structural priming did not show this same effect 
in the immediate (M = 10.83, SEM = 1.15 for sub-dominant interpretations, M = 
6.33, SEM = 1.15 for dominant interpretations;t2 (11) = 1.97, p = 0.07), same-
day (M = 10.00, SEM = 1.21 for sub-dominant interpretations, M = 6.33, SEM = 
1.02 for dominant interpretations;t2 (11) = 1.83, p = 0.09), or two-day conditions 
(M = 9.33, SEM = 1.13 for sub-dominant interpretations, M = 6.83, SEM = 1.11 
for dominant interpretations;t2 (11) = 1.17, p = 0.27), which suggests that, for 
structural priming, not all of the items were contributing to the lasting biasing 
effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2a.  Percentages of sub-dominant responses for Experiment 2 participant 
analysis  Note: baseline percentage indicated by dashed line. 
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Figure 2b.  Percentages of sub-dominant responses for Experiment 2 item 
analysis  Note: Baseline percentage indicated by dashed line. 
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structural priming have two separate time courses for retention of the 
interpretation they bias.  Whereas structural priming shows a steady, non-
significant drop in the frequency of context consistent interpretations from the 
immediate time delay (M = 7.17, SEM = 0.38) to the same-day delay (M = 6.67, 
SEM = 0.41; t1 (17) = 0.86, p = 0.40) and from the same-day delay (M = 6.67, 
SEM = 0.41) to the two-day delay (M = 6.22, SEM = 0.42; t1 (17) = 0.82, p = 
0.43), discourse priming shows a steady drop in retention from immediate (M = 
11.28 SEM = 0.21) to same-day (M = 10.83 SEM = 0.32; t1 (17) = 1.22, p = 
0.24), but shows a significant reduction in context-consistent interpretations from 
the same-day delay (M = 10.83 SEM = 0.32) to the two day delay (M = 7.94 
SEM = 0.36; t1 (17) = 7.82, p < 0.01).  Item analyses reflect this finding in 
structural priming (M = 10.83 SEM = 1.15 for the immediate condition, M = 10.00 
SEM = 1.21 for the same-day condition, M = 9.33 SEM = 1.13 for the two day 
condition; t2 (11) = 1.16, p = 0.27) and in discourse priming (M = 17.00 SEM = 
0.25 for the immediate condition, M = 16.25 SEM = 0.28 for the same-day 
condition, M = 11.92 SEM = 0.94 for the two day condition; t2 (11) = 5.37, p < 
0.01) suggesting that all items contributed to this effect.  Table 2a and table 2b 
are a summary of the means in the participant and item analyses. 
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Table 2a.  Means and standard errors for Experiment 2 participant analysis 
 
 Immediate Same-Day Two-Day 
Priming 
Material Dominant 
Sub-
Dominant Dominant
Sub-
Dominant Dominant 
Sub-
Dominant
Structural 
Priming 
4.22 
(0.43) 
7.17 
(0.38) 
4.22 
(0.38) 
6.67 
(0.41) 
4.56 
(0.41) 
6.22 
(0.41) 
Discourse 
Priming 
0.11 
(0.07) 
11.28 
(0.28) 
0.72 
(0.23) 
10.83 
(0.32) 
3.11 
(0.38) 
7.94 
(0.36) 
 
 
 
Table 2b.  Means and standard errors for Experiment 2 item analysis 
 
 Immediate Same-Day Two-Day 
Priming 
Material Dominant 
Sub-
Dominant Dominant
Sub-
Dominant Dominant 
Sub-
Dominant
Structural 
Priming 
6.33 
(1.15) 
10.83 
(1.15) 
6.33 
(1.02) 
10.00 
(1.21) 
6.83 
(1.11) 
9.33 
(1.13) 
Discourse 
Priming 
0.17 
(0.11) 
17.00 
(0.25) 
1.08 
(0.19) 
16.25 
(0.28) 
4.67 
(1.04) 
11.92 
(0.94) 
 
 
In addition to the differences in the time courses of retention for discourse 
priming and structural priming, there were differences in the frequencies of 
context-consistent interpretations between discourse priming and structural 
priming in the immediate (M = 11.28 SEM = 0.28 for discourse priming, M = 
7.17, SEM = 0.38 for structural priming; t1 (17) = 9.63, p < 0.01), same-day (M = 
10.83, SEM = 0.32 for discourse priming, M = 6.67 SEM = 0.41 for structural 
priming; t1 (17) = 8.68, p < 0.01), and two-day (M = 7.94, SEM = 0.36 for 
discourse priming, M = 6.22, SEM = 0.41 for structural priming; t1 (17) = 3.02, p 
< 0.01) time delay conditions.  These significant differences support the finding 
from Experiment 2 that while both structural priming and discourse priming are 
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capable of biasing people’s interpretations of conceptual combinations, 
discourse priming is more influential on the interpretation of a subsequent 
combination.  These differences were reflected in the item analyses of the 
immediate (M = 17.00, SEM = 0.25 for discourse priming, M = 10.83, SEM = 
1.15 for structural priming; t2 (11) = 5.99, p < 0.01) and same-day (M = 16.25 
SEM = 0.28 for discourse priming, M = 10.00 SEM = 1.21 for structural priming; 
t2 (11) = 5.67, p < 0.01) time delay conditions, but the effect was not present in 
the two-day delay (M = 11.92 SEM = 0.94 for discourse priming, M = 9.33 SEM 
= 1.13 for structural priming; t2 (11) = 2.40, SE = 1.07, p = 0.03) indicating that 
not all of the items in the two-day time delay contributed to the difference 
demonstrated by the participant analysis.    
Discussion 
The results from Experiment 2 indicate that while both structural priming and 
discourse priming affect conceptual combination interpretation, discourse 
priming is more robust in retention of the interpretation suggested by the context.  
This finding supports the hypothesis that structural priming and discourse 
priming have different influences on comprehension of a conceptual 
combination.  This is indicated by the different time courses of retention for the 
biased interpretation for the target conceptual combination even though the 
same interpretation was biased in the structural and discourse priming 
conditions.  Specifically, discourse priming not only biases a particular sense 
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more frequently than a structural prime, but the priming effect remains more 
influential over the course of time.  . 
 Results from Experiment 2 also offer additional evidence to support the 
claim from Experiment 1 that there is a significant difference in the frequency of 
context consistent interpretations derived from an discourse prime such as 
discourse and that of a structural prime such as priming conceptual combination 
presented before interpretation of the target conceptual combination.  This effect 
is most pronounced in the same-day and two-day time delays where 
participants, regardless of priming condition, were only given a brief exposure to 
the priming material before providing interpretations to the target conceptual 
combinations.  The significant differences illustrated in the post-hoc tests at 
these delay conditions are evidence that discourse is playing a much larger role 
than is suggested by structural theories of conceptual combination interpretation. 
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CONCLUSION 
The results presented in this study demonstrate that people’s interpretation of 
conceptual combinations is not only guided by the structure of the combinations 
themselves, but also by the contextual cues provided in the discourse 
surrounding the combinations.   Experiment 1 tested the immediate effects of 
structural priming and discourse priming on conceptual combination 
interpretation.  Participants in Experiment 1 were more likely to provide a 
context-consistent interpretation when the target conceptual combination was 
primed with another combination in discourse context than if the combination 
was primed simply with another combination sharing structural features.  
Furthermore, interpretations biased with an discourse prime were sustained for a 
longer period of time than those biased with structural priming materials, as 
demonstrated in Experiment 2. 
 The present study does not address the enormous range of possible 
interpretations for any one conceptual combination.  In Experiment 1, dominant 
and sub-dominant interpretations were defined as the two interpretations that 
people gave most often for each of the 12 target combinations when no priming 
material was presented prior to interpretation.  This definition led to subtle 
differences between the dominant and sub-dominant interpretations.  Evidence 
from this study indicates that discourse and noun-noun combinations can be 
used to prime a distinction between those subtle differences, but it does not 
address the effectiveness of discourse or noun-noun combination for biasing a 
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rare interpretation of a conceptual combination.  Rare interpretations, in the 
context of the normative data from Experiment 1, are interpretations that very 
few people would provide as a definition for the target conceptual combination.  
If the priming materials used in this study could be used to prime people to give 
a rare interpretation to a target conceptual combination, it would demonstrate 
that people take cues from their context (e.g. priming material) to make their 
interpretations of novel lexical terms such as conceptual combinations.   
Other lexical structures, such as metaphor, rely on discourse context to 
disambiguate their specific meanings.  Gerrig and Healy (1983) demonstrated 
that people use general knowledge about the target and base terms when 
interpreting metaphors.  Participants in this study interpreted the metaphors 
more quickly when the metaphorical contexts were a good match of what they 
describe (e.g. The night sky was filled with drops of molten silver) than when the 
context was a bad match for the object they were describing (e.g. The night sky 
was filled with drops of molten resin).  In both the good match and bad match 
metaphors, the phrases were understood more quickly when context was 
introduced prior to rather than following the metaphor.  This finding offers 
empirical support for the claim that people rely heavily on context to derive the 
specific meanings implied by novel metaphors (Gibbs & Gerrig, 1988). 
Some researchers have referred to the various stages of meaning 
phrases represent as the phrases’ careers (Gentner, Bowdle, Wolf, & Boronat, 
2001; Bowdle & Gentner, 2005).  The term indicates a developmental 
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progression that begins with the initial use of the term to convey a novel sense.  
According to Gentner and her colleagues, comprehension of such initially novel 
senses progresses through a series of increasingly conventionalized stages, 
given increased exposure and use.  Results from their studies indicate that 
people use a comparison strategy for interpreting novel metaphors (e.g. A mind 
is [like] a kitchen), but switch to a relational interpretation as the metaphor 
becomes more conventional (e.g. A soldier is [like] a pawn).  This finding is 
consistent with other research on how people learn the meanings for novel 
words (Chaffin, 1997).   
In their discussion of the “career” of metaphor, Bowdle and Gentner 
(2005) also discuss dead metaphors, or metaphors that have lost a semantic 
connection with the base concept.  Dead1 metaphors contain base terms that 
evoke two representations that are not semantically linked.  The base terms in 
dead1 metaphors have multiple meanings, but because one sense has been 
more widely used than the other (e.g. culture as a term to refer to societies of 
people versus culture as a term to refer to a growth preparation such as a mold 
culture grown in a Petri dish).  Dead2 metaphors are metaphors whose original 
base concept no longer exists.  The authors point to the term blockbuster as an 
example of one of these base terms.  Today, the term blockbuster is used to 
refer to commercially successful films in theatres, but a blockbuster was 
originally the term used to describe a large bomb capable of destroying a city 
block (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005).  The loss of culturally available contextual 
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biasing for initial interpretations in favor of new interpretations explains how such 
phrases go through progressive shifts in meaning. There are informative 
parallels between this characterization of how the meanings of metaphors 
evolve and the results from the experiments reported here.   
Discourse priming in the form of discourse context might also be useful in 
reviving dead metaphors.  As demonstrated in this study, discourse context can 
be used to bias the interpretation of a novel conceptual combination.  Such 
phrases are frequently adopted into the language as a kind of fixed phrases.  
Conceptual combinations not only allow people to make lexical shortcuts to 
express meaning more concisely, but they also allow people to introduce new 
senses to the lexicon that would not have been expressed with a single phrases 
otherwise.  For example, the term soccer mom is currently defined as a mother 
that transports her children to and from soccer practice.  Neither soccer nor 
mom could elicit this interpretation alone. These emergent properties (Wilkenfeld 
& Ward, 2001) are properties attributed to the combination that cannot be 
attributed to the constituent nouns of the combination.  Structural theories of 
conceptual combination have difficulty explaining these emergent properties 
because they rely heavily on the associated properties of the constituent nouns.  
The surrounding discourse context offers people a resource that they can use to 
derive these meanings.  Gerrig and Gibbs (1989) suggest that people use the 
emergent property aspect of conceptual combination and other creative 
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expressions of language to explain novel concepts that would be inexpressible 
by using the existing lexicon. 
There are several different directions research in conceptual combination 
interpretation could take given the results from this study.  For instance, the 
conceptual combinations used in this study were combinations that have not 
become a part of the lexicon.  Thus, another way one might investigate the 
effect of discourse context on conceptual combination interpretation might be to 
use discourse to bias a new meaning for conceptual combinations that have 
already been integrated into the lexicon.  Although Gentner and Bowdle (2005) 
caution that dead metaphors should be processed as categorizations only, the 
evidence provided in the current study suggests that a discourse context can be 
used to make a rare sense of a term more plausible.  Length of this “career” 
could be altered by the type of priming material used to bias a particular sense 
just as different types of priming show different patterns of sense retention in the 
set of studies described here.   
Most of the research in conceptual combination interpretation has used 
adult participants as interpreters of novel combinations.  Although there is a 
large body of work outlining the conceptual development of children (see Farrar, 
Raney, & Boyer, 1992, Keil, Smith, Simons, & Levin, 1998, Levine & Carey, 
1982, Sarnecka & Gelman, 2004), few studies have investigated conceptual 
combination interpretation with regard to language development in children.  
Such research could give researchers insight into both linguistic and conceptual 
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development.  In particular, it would help determine if the findings reported here 
characterize not only how adults makes sense of novel phrases, but also 
children develop the ability to make sense of such phrases.  
The results presented in this study indicate that people’s interpretations of 
conceptual combinations are based on the context in which people encounter 
the combination.  While both discourse and structural priming strategies are 
effective in biasing a specific interpretation for a conceptual combination, 
discourse shows a much stronger biasing effect that spans a longer period of 
time.  Findings from this study also indicate that people use the meaning implied 
by the constituent words of the combination as well as meaning implied by the 
surrounding context to derive their interpretations of conceptual combinations.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 36
REFERENCES 
Bortfeld, H. & McGlone, M. S. (2001).  The continuum of metaphor processing.   
 Metaphor & Symbol, 16, 75 – 86. 
Bortfeld, H., Sappington, R.E., Hull, M.R., & Smith, S.M. (2005).  The time  
 course of sense retention: Studies on the early career of conceptual  
 combination.  Manuscript submitted for publication. 
Bowdle, B.F. & Gentner, D. (2005).  The career of metaphor.  Psychological  
 Review, 112, 193 – 216. 
Carlin, G. (1990).  Euphemisms.  On Parental Advisory – Explicit Lyrics [CD]. 
 New York: Atlantic Records. 
Chaffin, R. (1997).  Associations to unfamiliar words: Learning the meanings of  
new words.  Memory & Cognition, 25, 203 – 226. 
Chaffin, R., Morris, R.K., & Seely, R. E. (2001).  Learning new word meanings  
from context: A study of eye movements.  Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 27, 225 – 235. 
Cook, A.E. & Myers, J.L. (2003). Processing discourse roles in scripted  
narratives: The influences of context and world knowledge.  Journal of 
Memory and Language, 50, 268 – 288. 
Estes, Z. (2003).  A tale of two similarities:  Comparison and integration in  
conceptual combination.  Cognitive Science, 27, 911 – 921. 
Farrar, M.J., Raney, G.E., & Boyer, M.E. (1992).  Knowledge, concepts,  
 inferences in childhood.  Child Development, 63, 673 – 691. 
 37
Gagné, C.L. (2000).  Relation-based combinations versus property-based 
combinations: A test of the CARIN theory and the dual-process theory 
conceptual combination.  Journal of Memory and Language, 42, 365 – 
389. 
Gagné, C.L. (2001).  Relation and lexical priming during the interpretation of 
noun-noun combinations.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, & Cognition, 27, 236 – 254. 
Gagné, C.L. & Shoben, E.J. (2002).  Priming relations in ambiguous noun-noun  
combinations.  Memory & Cognition, 30, 637 – 646. 
Gagné, C.L. & Spalding, T.L. (2004).  Effect of discourse context and modifier  
relation frequency on conceptual combination.  Journal of Memory 
Language, 50, 444 – 455. 
Gentner, D. & Bowdle, B.F. (2005).  The career of metaphor.  Psychological  
Review, 112, 193 – 216. 
Gentner, D. Bowdle, B. F., Wolff, P., & Boronat, C. (2001).  Metaphor is like  
analogy.  In D. Getner & K. Holyoak (Eds.)  The analogical mind: 
Perspectives from cognitive science.  (pp.  199 – 253) Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press. 
Gerrig, R.J. & Bortfeld, H. (1999).  Sense creation in and out of discourse  
contexts.  Journal of Memory and Language, 41, 457 – 468. 
 
 
 38
Gerrig, R.J. & Gibbs, R.W. (1989).  How context makes metaphor  
comprehension seem “special”.  Metaphor and Symbolic Activity, 4, 145 – 
158.  
Gerrig, R.J. & Healy, A.J. (1983).  Dual processes in metaphor understanding: 
 Comprehension and appreciation.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
 Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 9, 667 – 675. 
Gerrig, R.J. & Murphy, G.L. (1992). Contextual influences on the  
comprehension of complex concepts.  Language & Cognitive Processes, 
7, 205 – 230. 
Gerrig, R.J. & Gibbs, R.W. (1988).  Beyond the lexicon: Creativity in language  
 production.  Metaphor and Symbolic Activity, 3, 1 – 19. 
Gibbs, R.W. (1992).  What do idioms really mean?  Journal of Memory and  
Language, 31, 485 – 506. 
Gibbs, R.W. & Gerrig, R.J. (1989).  How context makes comprehension seem,  
 “special”. Metaphor and Symbolic Activity, 4, 145 – 158. 
Gibbs, R.W. & Nayak, N. (1989).  Psycholinguistic studies on the syntactic  
behavior of idioms.  Cognitive Psychology, 21, 100 – 138. 
Giora, R. (1997).  Understanding figurative and literal languages: The graded  
           salience hypothesis.  Cognitive Linguistics, 8, 183 – 206.  
Giora, R. (2002).  On our mind: salience, context, and figurative language.   
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
 
 39
Keil, F.C., Smith, W C., Simons, D.J., & Levin, D.T. (1998).  Two dogmas of  
conceptual empiricism: Implications for hybrid of the structure of 
knowledge.  Cognition, 65, 103 – 135. 
Levine, S.C. & Carey, S. (1982).  Up front: The acquisition of a concept and a  
 word.  Journal of Child Language, 9, 645 – 657. 
Murphy, G. (1996).  On metaphoric representation.  Cognition, 60, 173 – 203. 
Murphy, G. (1997).  Reasons to doubt the present evidence for metaphoric  
representation.  Cognition, 62, 99 – 108. 
Myers, J.L., Cook, A.E., Kambe, G., Mason, R.A., & O’Brien, E.J. (2000).   
Semantic and episodic effects on bridging differences.  Discourse  
Processes, 29, 179 – 199. 
Sarnecka, B.W. & Gelman, S. A. (2004).  Six does not mean a lot: Preschoolers  
 see numbers as specific.  Cognition, 92, 329 – 352. 
Wilkenfeld, M.J., & Ward, T.B. (2001).  Similarity and emergence in conceptual 
 combination.  Journal of Memory and Language, 45, 21 – 38. 
Wisniewski, E.J. (1996).  Construal and similarity in conceptual combination.   
Journal of Memory and Language, 35, 434 – 453. 
Wisniewski, E.J., & Love, B.C. (1998).  Relations versus properties in  
conceptual combination.  Journal of Memory and Language, 38, 177 – 
202. 
 
 
 40
Wisniewski, E.J., & Middleton, E.L. (2002).  Of bucket bowls and coffee cup  
bowls: Spatial alignment in conceptual combination.  Journal of Memory 
and Language, 46, 1 – 23. 
Xu, J., Kemney, S., Park, G., Frattali, C., & Braun, A. (2005).  Language in  
context: Emergent features of word, sentence, and narrative 
comprehension.  NeuroImage, 25, 1002 - 1015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 41
APPENDIX A 
DOMINANT AND SUBDOMINANT INTERPRETATIONS AND PERCENTAGES 
OF RESPONSES WITH NO PRIMING MATERIAL PRESENT 
Carpenter Toy 
 
Dominant – A toy made by a carpenter. (50%) 
Sub-Dominant – A toy for a carpenter. (45%) 
 
Factory Chemical 
 
Dominant – A chemical product of a factory. (50%) 
Sub-Dominant – A chemical that is used in a factory. (45%) 
 
Juvenile Story 
 
Dominant – A story made/written for juveniles. (40%) 
Sub-Dominant – A story made/written by a juvenile. (35%) 
 
Clay Machine 
 
Dominant – A machine that makes clay. (45%) 
Sub-Dominant – A machine made out of clay. (40%) 
 
Funeral Dish 
 
Dominant – A dish (ie food) prepared for a funeral. (40%) 
Sub-Dominant – A dish (ie the plate) made for a funeral. (35%) 
 
Porch Wood 
 
Dominant – Wood that is lying on a porch. (55%) 
Sub-Dominant – Wood that is used to make a porch. (45%) 
 
Adolescent Doctor 
 
Dominant – A doctor for adolescents. (50%) 
Sub-Dominant – A doctor that is an adolescent. (45%) 
 
 
Chocolate Book 
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Dominant – A book about chocolate. (40%) 
Sub-Dominant – A book made of chocolate. (35%) 
 
Money Student 
 
Dominant – A student that studies money (i.e. economics major). (40%) 
Sub-Dominant – A student that always has money (i.e. rich). (35%) 
 
Paper Tree 
 
Dominant – Tree that is made of paper. (45%) 
Sub-Dominant – Tree that will be used to make paper. (40%) 
 
Pickle House 
 
Dominant – House made of pickles. (30%) 
Sub-Dominant – Storage house for pickles. (25%) 
 
Meat Train 
 
Dominant – Train made of meat (e.g. linked sausages). (50%) 
Sub-Dominant – Train that transports meat. (45%) 
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APPENDIX B 
STRUCTURAL PRIMING STIMULI  
(TARGET COMBINATION IN PARENTHESES) 
Adolescent Student (Adolescent Doctor) 
 
The middle school principal told the incoming 7th Grade class in their orientation, 
“As an adolescent student, our expectations are that you are responsible for 
your own schoolwork.” 
 
Chocolate Egg (Chocolate Book) 
 
Jan liked Easter morning because she could eat a giant chocolate egg and her 
parents didn’t stop her. 
 
Clay Tool (Clay Machine) 
 
Many ancient people in Europe used a clay tool to do anything from cooking to 
grooming. 
 
Funeral Music (Funeral Dish) 
 
On his deathbed, Jeff said that he wanted Box of Rain, St. Stephen, and The 
Eleven as his funeral music. 
 
Porch Swing (Porch Wood) 
 
Grandpa always doled out his life lessons while rocking on his old porch swing. 
 
Carpenter Hammer (Carpenter Toy) 
 
Standard equipment for all of the day laborers on a construction site includes a 
carpenter hammer. 
 
Meat Trey (Meat Train) 
 
Zoë used the meat pan to carry several pieces of chicken breasts, hamburger  
patties, and a couple of beefsteaks to the grill. 
 
Factory Equipment (Factory Chemical) 
 
There were several large machines among the factory equipment. 
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Juvenile Complaint (Juvenile Story) 
 
The older members of the jury were tired of Lucy’s juvenile complaint about their 
indecision. 
 
Money Parent (Money Student) 
 
Lee’s money parent always made sure he had plenty of cash for gas and 
concert tickets. 
 
Paper Clip (Paper Tree) 
 
Since there were no staples in the stapler, Ed used a paper clip to bind his 
report. 
 
Pickle Fork (Pickle House) 
 
In Southern Mississippi, locals use a pickle fork to reach the pickles at the 
bottom of the jar. 
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APPENDIX C 
 DISCOURSE PRIMING STIMULI 
Carpenter Toy 
On their day off, Dayton and Chip, both wood workers, were playing with a new  
set of tools.  They used many gadgets such as a laser lever to fit windows to wall 
openings, a tape measure that could record measurements, and a sonic hammer.   
The carpenter toy they liked the most was the laser level. 
Factory Chemical  
Gina worked for the Ener-Cell battery company.  As part of her job, she was in  
contact with battery fluid daily.  Gina recently quit the job because she was  
diagnosed with a rare form of cancer.  She believed the factory chemical  
played a key role in the formation of this cancer. 
Juvenile Story 
For a recent movie, Director Jones needed a realistic vignette for why one of  
his characters was not doing her homework.  Several entries were submitted  
including accounts from a pre-school child, a juvenile in middle school, and  
one from Director Jones’ own daughter.  After looking through the stories,  
Director Jones settled on the juvenile story. 
Clay Machine 
Ancient man was able to do many things for which we do not give them credit.   
In Ancient China, for example, artisans sculpted gears from thick mud that  
were used to make one of the world’s first mechanical timepieces.   
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This provided archeologists with evidence of the first clay machine in history. 
Funeral Dish 
As a tradition in the I’oka tribe, Baba had to create some artifact for his father  
to take with him into the next life.  On the day of the burial, Baba placed a 
commemorative plate in his father’s tomb.  All who saw it agreed that the  
funeral dish was so elegant, that even death would not dare to take it from him. 
Porch Wood 
Harry, the contractor the Harts hired to build the outdoor area on their luxury  
home, suggested that they use teak as opposed to pre-treated pine.   
Natural termite resistance and the beautiful discoloration after weathering  
were two factors that played a role in the Harts’ decision to use teak as their  
porch wood. 
Adolescent Doctor 
Few children were as privileged as Dr. Charlie Hitchcock.  He graduated from  
high school at such a young age that most of his peers were still working on  
their ABCs.  Not yet old enough to vote, this adolescent doctor is poised to be  
this year’s Nobel Prize winner in physiology. 
Chocolate Book 
The selection at Warren’s candy store not only satisfied the sweet tooth, but  
also inspired the mind.  There were candy cell phones with jellybean buttons 
 for children on the go, a gingerbread guitar whose strings were made of  
licorice, and a chocolate book for the quintessential bookworm. 
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Money Student 
Years ago, Paul Scott won the state lottery, and he now appears to be  
content to go to school forever.  He already has degrees in English,  
Architecture, and Sociology.  Although the professors think he needs to  
move on to the outside world, they concede that the money student  
can go to school as long as he can pay tuition. 
Paper Tree 
A convenient setting for a pulp mill is to have as adjacent forest from which to cut 
pulpwood.  After the lumber companies cut down trees usable for plywood,  
Cherry Mills Company goes to the forest and marks any tree they deem mature  
enough to be a paper tree. 
Pickle House 
Condiments Inc., a distributor of condiments to restaurants across the world,  
stores its products in the outbuildings of an old plantation.  The root cellar is  
now the mustard storage facility, the shed is filled with ketchup bottles, but the  
pickle house, which is loaded with cases of pickle jars, is the only building  
that retained its original function. 
Meat Train 
In the mid-1800s, there was a large demand for low-cost beef east of the  
Mississippi River.  Cowboys were critical in meeting that demand.  They were 
responsible for driving cattle to key rail stations from which the cattle could  
be loaded onto an eastward bound meat train. 
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